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RICHARD C. ALLISON*

The Carl Zeiss Case
They were standing under a tree, each with an arm round the other's
neck, and Alice knew which was which in a moment, because one of
them had "DUM" embroidered on his collar, and the other "DEE."
CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS
Unlike Alice, the courts of at least five nations outside Germany
have not found it easy to identify the Carl Zeiss firm which is entitled
to the ownership and use of the Zeiss trademarks in relation to optical
and precision instruments. In an infringement action commenced in
1962 in the United States, District Court for the Southern District of
New York has held that the United States trademarks ("Zeiss," "Zeiss
Ikon," "Carl Zeiss Jena," etc.) are of the property the Zeiss firm
located in West Germany over the objections of its counterpart in the
East.
The dispute, which bears traces of Bismark, Marx, Hitler and E.
Phillips Oppenheim, turns upon the efforts of each of the parties to
establish its identity as the true continuation of the original Zeiss
interests of Jena, which is now located in the German Democratic
Republic (East Germany). In addition to this question, which is an
extraordinarily tangled web of factual and legal issues, Judge Walter R.
Mansfield dealt with a considerable variety of legal arguments offered
by counsel for both sides, including (in addition to trademark and
conflict of laws principles) German state and federal law, the
act-of-state doctrine, laches and acquiescence, collateral estoppel, cy
pres, res judicata and comity.
This article attempts simply to summarize the Zeiss case and its
background as the facts and law are set forth in the opinion of the
District Court. At this writing, the court has deferred entry of a
*The author is a member of the New York Bar, a graduate of the University of Virginia Law
School and chairman of the Section's Committee on Latin American Law.
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judgment preceding resolution of issues raised by certain antitrust
defenses and counterclaims entered by the defendants.
The suit, which was instituted by the West German Zeiss firm, is
one of a series of legal actions involving worldwide confrontations
between West German Zeiss and several Zeiss companies based in East
Germany. Each group claims to be identical with the original Carl Zeiss
Stiftung (Stiftung being roughly equivalent to our trust or foundation),
which was organized in Jena in 1889 but which had its roots in an
enterprise established there in 1846. The original Stiftung (hereinafter
"Foundation")-as constituted by its founder, Dr. Ernst Abbe, a
partner of Carl Zeiss-was rather unusual in several important respects.
Although it was organized to carry on commercial activities for profit
(the court rejected defendants' argument that the Foundation had from
the outset been an eleemosynary and essentially public institution
whose real nature was not changed by its subsequent communization),
it had no shareholders and no owners as such. Its founder stipulated
that the profits must be devoted to the maintenance and growth of the
Zeiss business and the provision of economic benefits for Zeiss
employees. Secondarily, any surplus was to be used to develop the
technology upon which the operations were based, and the welfare of
the working population in and around Jena. This identification with
Jena was strengthened by the fact that Dr. Abbe, with a perhaps
understandable lack of prescience as to 20th century geopolitics,
specified in the Foundation's charter (the Statute) that the seat of its
operations should not be removed from Jena and that this provision
could not be modified. The "Statute" of the foundation provided that
its management and its subordinate concerns would be carried out
through a rather elaborate system of boards designed to provide lengthy
tenure as well as checks and balances. The stature forged a further link
with Jena through a provision that the functions of the Special Board,
which, had the power to appoint the other Boards, would be performed
by such institution of the Grand Duchy of Saxe-Weimar as at the time
supervised the University of Jena.
In 1945, the United States Army occupied Jena, but the United
States agreed to withdraw its forces in July of that year in favor of the
Soviet forces. In departing, the United States Army transported the top
management and some 122 key personnel of the Foundation from Jena
to Heidenheim, Wfierttemberg, in the American Zone of Occupation.
This was done by order of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary
Forces (SHAEF) in furtherance of the United States war effort against
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Japan, and it is to be presumed that the Statute of the Carl Zeiss
Stiftung was not consulted by the military authorities in relation to the
move.
The circumstances of the forced departure from Jena posed a
significant question of fact in this litigation: the defendants maintained
that the departing board members, fearing Russian reprisals in Jena
because of their alleged support of the Nazi administration, orally
resigned. Plaintiffs asserted that there had been no resignations, and no
intention to resign, and pointed out that the transported board
members had named attorneys-in-fact to manage the Jena works during
their (contemplated) temporary absence. This was the management
posture of the Zeiss concern when the Soviet authorities entered Jena
in July 1945.
At this time of great confusion throughout Germany, the board
members, now in Heidenheim, seem to have believed that it would be
possible to preserve the integrity of the Zeiss properties in both zones
of occupation. The Soviets had not yet embarked upon their ruthless
program of dismantling the German industrial complex, and shipping it
piecemeal to Russia as reparations. Nor had the massive confiscations of
private property begun. However, it was not long before cracks began
to appear in the management structure which the Board members in the
West had sought to construct. In January 1946, their colleagues in Jena,
apparently acting under Soviet pressure calculated to centralize the
Zeiss interests in the East, sent them a message, characterized in the
opinion of the court as the "blackmail letter," at a time when the
Heidenheim Board members were facing both American and German
war crimes investigations. The Jena management, key members of
which could corroborate the Heidenheim Board's testimony as to
certain anti-Nazi actions taken by them during the war, suggested in
their letter that the Heidenheim Board step aside, recognize the Jena
representatives as the true board, and accept powers of attorney from
Jena to act for Carl Zeiss in the West. Recognizing their predicament,
the Heidenheim board did as they were told, without however
presenting resignations as Board members. Thus, according to the
findings of the court, there was erected a management facade that,
creaky but at least temporarily effective, permitted the caretakers in
Jena to pass themselves off on the Russians as the true Board, while the
true board in Heidenheim, secretly recognized as such by the Jena
"board," purported to act in the West as attorneys-in-fact under
appointments executed in Jena. Superficially at least, the roles of the
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 3 No. 3
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two groups had been reversed; but, as Judge Mansfield found on the
basis of the testimony of live witnesses from both sides of the
East/West line, as well as from contemporaneous documentation, the
reality was different and the vital thread leading from the original Jena
Board to the Heidenheim Board was not severed by these arrangements
and duplicities.
The deception practiced on the Soviet occupation authorities-if
this is a proper description-may have been successful, but to little
avail. During 1947, 94% of the Jena Zeiss' equipment and 300 of its
employees were shipped to the Soviet Union pursuant to that country's
reparations program, and, after the Jena plants were partially rebuilt,
they were expropriated without compensation in June 1948 by the
Soviet-established Land Expropriation Commission in Thuringia, East
Germany. The confiscation purported to embrace all Zeiss assets
outside the Soviet Union, including those in the West. Defendants urged
that the confiscation was not meant to extend to the Zeiss trademarks,
but the court found otherwise.
Where, then, did these events leave the Foundation if, indeed, it
survived at all? Under well established principles of law in the United
States, the confiscatory seizure of trademarks with a legal situs in this
country will not be recognized or given effect here. Saying that this
does not, however, answer the question as to the ownership of the Zeiss
trademarks, the court put the matters as follows:
A central and primary issue in this case is whether the plaintiff
Foundation or that established in East Germany in 1951 is legally
identical with, and the successor to, the original Abbe Foundation,
which is without question entitled to exclusive use of the United States
trademarks in dispute. The Soviet expropriation purported to encompass all Zeiss trademarks owned by the Zeiss firm, wherever located. In
view of the well-settled United States policy against extraterritorial
recognition of such decrees, the Foundation or its legal successor, if it
has legally continued to exist (whether in East Germany, West
Germany, or elsewhere), must be recognized as the owner of the United
States marks. Furthermore, while a United States court may give effect
to expropriation of property located within the territory of the
expropriating state, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S.
398 (1964), United States trademarks, for the purpose of determining
the applicability of our anti-expropriation policy, are deemed to be
located within the United States, ever though the trademarked goods
may be manufactured elsewhere, Zwack v. Kraus Bros. & Co., 237 F.2d
255 (2d Cir. 1956); F. Palicioy Compania, S.A. v. Brush, 256 F. Supp.
481, 151 U.S.P.Q. (S.D.N.Y. 1966); and see Baglin v. Cusenier Co., 221
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U.S. 580, 596 (1911), and our anti-expropriation policy applies with

full vigor with respect to property outside the taking state.
Since the objective of our policy is to prevent the unfair consequences of expropriation without compensation, we are required as a
counterpart of that policy, insofar as it is possible to do so, to identify
the owners surviving the confiscation, and to award the property to

them. In this case, therefore, since the Soviet's purported expropriation
of the United States Zeiss trademarks violated our anti-expropriation
policy, leaving the Foundation's ownership unaffected, our task is to
identify the surviving owner as between the various claimants. (160 U.S.
P.Q. at 121.) How the court dealt with this central question will appear
below.

Extinction of Jena Foundation
On the Expropriation
The court found, despite vigorous argument by defendants to the
contrary, that the Foundation expired in East Germany when it was
deprived of its commercial assets there and, thus, of its reason for
being. In addition, legal experts testified that under the law of the
Soviet Zone the expropriation terminated the existence of the entity
whose properties were seized.
"Sham" Foundation
As a result of certain efforts of the Western (Heidenheim) Zeiss
management to legitimate their position and to bar shipments to the
West, of goods manufactured in Jena under the Zeiss trademark, steps
were taken in East Germany in 1951 to "warm up" the Foundation
there. Officials were appointed with six years of retroactivity, meetings
were resumed, and, in general, everything was done to breathe life into
the Foundation in Jena except as to restoration of its confiscated
properties or permission to function in any meaningful way. Judge
Mansfield, disregarding a ruling by the East German Supreme Court for
the reasons described below under "German Decisions," agreed with
plaintiffs' contention that the result was nothing more than a
pseudo-Foundation created to establish a color of right to property
outside East Germany.
Creation of a New Domicile
for the Foundation in the West
If the Foundation in Jena became defunct in 1948, and its
resurrection in 1951 was illusory, what of the Heidenheim group?
Once it became clear in Heidenheim that there was no hope of
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 3 No. 3
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salvaging the Jena properties, the management in Heidenheim moved to
legalize the Foundation's de facto existence in the West as the
representative of the Zeiss firm. In this purpose they were aided by two
circumstances: (1) the German Civil Code remains in effect in both
Germanies, and (2) in German law there is a more fluid concept of the
domicile of juridical entities than, for example, in American law.
Although chartered by a state, a German foundation's or corporation's
"nationality" (i.e., the laws which govern its existence) ordinarily
depends upon the location of its principal place of business. Underlying
the state law, moreover, is the concept that a foundation is basically a
creature of federal law and governed, therefore, by the federal Civil
Code, except to the extent that the administration of that Code is
delegated to the states.
With this background, Heidenheim Zeiss sought a change in the
Foundation's domicile from Jena to Heidenheim based upon Articles
80 and 87 of the German Civil Code. Article 80 provided that a
foundation might be established by approval of the state in which it
was to be domiciled, and that, absent other provisions, its domicile
should be where its administration was in fact conducted. Article 87 in
effect codified a cy pres doctrine for foundations, empowering "the
appropriate authority," with due regard for the intention of the
founder, to amend a foundation's statute to change its purpose when
the original purpose had become frustrated. Insofar as the founder's
consent is concerned, the court analyzed the statute as well as
explanatory writings of Dr. Abbe, and concluded that he would have
wanted the Foundation to continue in a location other than Jena in the
event that it became impossible for it to operate there. ["It defies
common sense to say that a foundation's domicile must continue in a
state which seizes its basic assets and denies it the right to carry out its
purposes." (160 U.S.P.Q at 127)] Basing its action upon Article 87, the
State of Wuerttemberg issued a decree in 1949 transferring the
Foundation to Heidenheim.
Choice of Law
In addressing itself to the parties' arguments concerning the
legality and effect of the Wuerttemberg decree, the court was faced at
the outset with the question as to whether the law of East or of West
Germany should be applied. The courts of both Germanies had
considered and ruled upon the Zeiss situation with predictably opposite
results.
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Defendants argued for the application of East German law and
decisions, for the reason that Jena, where the Foundation was
organized, is located there, while plaintiffs contended that the laws and
interpretations of a government not recognized by the United States
should not be given effect in a United States court. One can sympathize
with the opinion's slightly wistful comment at this point: "Choice of
law rules normally assume the existence of a territory having an
appropriate relationship to the issue, over which the recognized foreign
government claims sovereignty." (160 U.S.P.Q. at 124)
Declining to adopt a doctrinaire approach to the choice of law,
Judge Mansfield weighed the decisions of both East and West German
tribunals, saying:
However, to resolve these questions solely according to German
law as promulgated and declared by authorities and courts of West
Germany ignores the fact that even though the Foundation had no
significant contacts with the authorities of Thuringia or successor
political divisions in East Germany after it was destroyed in the East
through Soviet expropriation, it did come into existence through action
of the authorities of the Duchy of Saxe-Weimar, later merged into the
State of Thuringia, which in turn became, successively, part of the
territory controlled by the Soviet Military Administration and the
unrecognized German Democratic Republic (East Germany). In view of
the Foundation's territorial contacts with the East before its capacity
to function there was destroyed, this Court should not be precluded
from considering decisions handed down by the courts of East
Germany with respect to the Foundation's legal identity, powers, and
status, and giving them such weight as they appear to merit. (160
U.S.P.Q. at 124-125)
German Decisions
In appraising the value of the German decisions, the court was not
greatly impressed by the East German Holding in an ex parte proceeding,
that the Foundation in Jena was identical with the original. Judge
Mansfield's comments on the quality of justice in East Germany are
interesting:
Quite aside from the fact that the decisions of the courts of East
Germany were based on different factual premises (Author's note:
different because much of the proof adduced before the U.S. court had
not been presented to the East German courts), however, it must be
recognized in weighing these decisions that East German courts do not
speak as an independent judiciary of the type found in the United
States or even in West Germany, but orient their judgment according to
the wishes of the leaders of the socialist state, which are expressed
through two coordinated administrative organs, the Ministry of Justice
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 3 No. 3
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and t1le Office of the Attorney General. See The Administration of
Justice and the Concept of Legality in East Germany, 68 YALE L.J.
705, 707 (1959). In short, even the East German Supreme Court is
made responsible to the highest authorities of the state as a means of
insuring "that the content of socialist law and its implementation
through the courts are in harmony with the overall state administrative
activity during the period of the comprehensive construction of
socialism." * (Citation omitted) Nevertheless, to the extent that they
may shed light on the legal issues before this Court, they have been
considered.
Such consideration reveals the decisions of the Supreme Court of
East Germany to be so completely lacking in any objectivity of
approach and so thoroughly saturated with a combination of communist propaganda, diatribes against the "capitalist oriented" decisions
of the West German courts, and absence of judicial restraint, that any
logical analysis is obfuscated by their obvious political mission. For
example, after haranguing on the importance and necessity of smashing
the Foundation because its assets were used to further "the Fascist
predatory war" and amounted to a "war crime," and after conceding
that its Jena works had been expropriated, the Court disregards
noncompliance thereafter with the essential basis of the Abbe Statute
(the Foundations' ownership and operation of its commercial enterprises), simply stating that it "suffered no losses of property apart from
having ceased on 17 April 1948 or 1 June 1948 to be the manager of
the Jena Stiftung works of old." This, of course, is the equivalent of
politely saying it ceased to function at all in Jena. West German court
decisions are described in the following terms: inspired and controlled
by "monopolistic-capitalistic circles"; "nothing to do with juridical
reasoning but amounts to an irresponsible juggling with fictitious
notions"; "formalistic bourgeois methods (which) make it impossible to
veil such coarse violations of law"; "pretense of strict lawfulness";
"conscious falsification" and "contradictions between peacefully
minded population and a warlike revenge-inspired State, which find
their expression chiefly in the clerico-militaristic federation at Bonn."
(160 U.S.P.Q. at 129-130)
*Toward this purpose East German Judges after being selected by the
Ministry of Justice are "instructed" by it and are removeable for
inefficiency or unreliability arising out of policy differences. The
"judge remains a simple party servant," 68 Yale L.J. 707-12, 749
(1959).
In contrast, Judge Mansfield found the decisions of the courts of
West Germany to be "restrained, objective, reasonably logical, and
dispassionate in their approach" (160 U.S.P.Q. at 130). Nonetheless,
though the cases in West Germany had been full dress adversary
proceedings, he did not consider that the doctrine of collateral estoppel
could be applied here to resolve the case fully for the reason that the
InternationalLawye,
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issues decided by the West German courts were not identical with those
before him. In particular, the West German courts had not found it
necessary to decide-as did Judge Mansfield-that the Foundation's
domicile had been transferred validly to Wuerttemberg pursuant to the
German Civil Code, which spanned the division between East and West.
Act-of-State Doctrine
Plaintiffs argued that two Wuerttemberg decrees of 1949 and
1954, transferring the Foundation's domicile from Jena to Heidenheim,
and a 1967 law of the West German Parliament confirming such
decrees, were acts of state, the validity of which would not be
questioned by a court in the United States under the doctrine
reaffirmed in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398
(1964). Judge Mansfield agreed that the decrees and law in question
were acts of the West German state and therefore not subject to
question or attack in his court but that this was so only as to one side
of the coin, the status of the Foundation in West Germany:
Thus, although the Wuerttemberg decrees and the German
Parliament's Act of 1967 are not entitled to recognition as acts of state
to the extent that they purport to terminate the Foundation's domicile
in East Germany since to that extent they acted extraterritorially, they
are entitled to such recognition insofar as they acted to give a legal
status to the Foundation's de facto existence in West Germany as a
continuation in the West of the original Zeiss cooperative enterprise,
whose remaining commercial assets (worth 30 million marks) and
personnel were almost entirely within the West's territorial jurisdiction.
(See comments to §27, Restatement of Foreign Relations Law.)
Although its United States trademarks are deemed to have their situs
here and a line must be drawn somewhere between the direct and
indirect territorial consequences of an act of state, the Wuerttemberg
Decrees and 1967 Law did not purport to adjudicate ownership of
these marks. They simply recognized that the Foundation was now
located in West Germany. The act of state doctrine is not rendered
inapplicable because the act involved has some impact outside of the
territory of the acting state. (160 U.S.P.Q. at 134).

Comity
The court also recognized that, apart from the act of state
doctrine, which is based upon the pragmatic consideration that the
courts of this nation should not through their decisions complicate the
conduct of its foreign affairs, general principles of comity among
friendly nations support the mutual acceptance of their official acts:
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Regardless of their status as acts of state, the
Decrees and 1967 Law represent the acts of a friendly
diplomatically recognized by the United States, which
with, and in furtherance of, our own Government's
interests.

Wuerttemberg
foreign power,
are consistent
foreign policy

In such circumstances, absent some fundamental policy objections
(such as those inherent in penal or revenue laws), the acts in question
are entitled to recognition under principles of comity, at least for
purposes of determining ownership of property having its situs in the
United States (i.e., the United States Zeiss name and marks). Anderson
v. N. V. TransandineHandelmaatachappij,289 N.Y. 9 (1942); State of
the Netherlands v. FederalReserve Bank, 201 F.2d 455 (2d Cir. 1953).
Faced with a remarkably similar situation in Anderson, the New York
Court of Appeals stated:
"There can be no doubt that the decree of May 24, 1940,
promulgated by the recognized government of the State of the
Netherlands is part of the law of a friendly sovereign State of which the
defendants are subjects and in which the defendants are domiciled...
By Comity of nations, rights based upon the law of a foreign State to
intangible property, which has a situs in this State, are recognized and
enforced by the courts of this State, unless such enforcement would
offend the public policy of this State. That rule is part of the law of
this State, as it is, in general, the law of all countries which accept the
reign of law." (289 N.Y. at p. 19) (160 U.S.P.Q. at 134).

It has not been feasible in the space alloted to deal with each of
the many agruments presented by counsel for both sides. Nor have we
undertaken to review here the cases decided by the courts of other
countries (including France, England, West Pakistan and Switzerland)
although it may be noted that an introductory decision of the House of
Lords is at variance with that of Judge Mansfield in that the English
decision gave effect to the holdings of the courts of East Germany.
In summary, the decision of the District Court that West German
Zeiss owns the United States trademarks is founded on the court's
finding that the Heidenheim Foundation is the legitimate Zeiss
Foundation. This finding, in turn, is based primarily upon the court's
determination of the facts and the law of the Germanies as elucidated
by experts that (a) the Foundation's officials, upon their forced
transfer from Jena to Heidenheim in 1945, did not resign their
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positions (b) the Foundation in Jena became inoperable as a result of
measures taken under the Soviet occupation, and (c) the steps taken by
the Foundation in Heidenheim to adapt to a radically new situation by
shifting the Foundation's domicile out of Jena were legally valid and
effective.
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